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nder the term opinions we subsume also bela b s t r a c t
We study a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks. In our model,
boundedly rational agents update opinions by averaging over their neighbors’ expressed
opinions, but may misrepresent their own opinion by conforming or counter-conforming
with their neighbors. We show that an agent's social influence on the long-run group
opinion is increasing in network centrality and decreasing in conformity. Concerning
efficiency of information aggregation or “wisdom” of the society, it turns out that
misrepresentation of opinions need not undermine wisdom, but may even enhance it.
Given the network, we provide the optimal distribution of conformity levels in the society
and show which agents should be more conforming in order to increase wisdom.
& 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Opinions crucially shape individual behavior and affect economic decisions and outcomes.1 For instance, opinions on
political issues set the political course, opinions about a product's quality and the integrity of its producer influence demand,
and opinions about an economy's growth determine investment decisions. The formation and evolution of opinions are
often carried by day-to-day interactions of individuals, i.e. the opinions are determined by exchange in a social network.
We model the formation of opinions through communication in a given social network such that individuals are
influenced by the opinions stated by others: individuals update their opinion in a naïve way by taking a weighted average of
others' stated opinions (as in the literature on naïve learning, see e.g. DeGroot, 1974; DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and
Jackson, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2010). However, influence often goes beyond this simple updating of opinions. When asked
for a personal opinion, people usually do not straightforwardly state what they truly think, rather they are tempted to.
e (B. Buechel), tim.hellmann@uni-bielefeld.de (T. Hellmann),
iefs, judgments, and estimations – depending on the application.
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empirical evidence). In this paper, we consequently allow that not only the own opinion is influenced by what others say,
but also the statement itself. In other words, some individuals tweak their stated opinions to conform to what their social
contacts say.
In such a framework, we study the long-run dynamics of opinions and particularly focus on how conformity affects
opinion leadership and how it affects the quality of information aggregation (“wisdom”). Concerning opinion leadership, we
obtain a closed-form solution for the influence of an agent on the long-run consensus opinion (i.e. her power). It is
determined not only by each individual's position in the network, given by eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1972; Friedkin,
1991; DeMarzo et al., 2003), but also by the distribution of conformity in the society. Comparative statics reveal that an
agent's power is increasing in own network centrality, increasing in other agents' level of conformity, but decreasing in own
level of conformity. The last result, hence, explains the empirical finding that opinion leaders are often characterized by low
conformity.2
Concerning quality of information aggregation, we interpret initial opinions as unbiased noisy signals about some true
state of nature, and study the precision of the consensus beliefs. First, in a finite population setup, we are able to exactly
determine the quality of information aggregation depending on network position, initial signal quality and the distribution
of conformity. It turns out that heterogeneous levels of conformity foster precision of the consensus beliefs if conformity is
distributed such that it balances the power of agents with their signal quality. Agents who are connected to multiple groups
and, thereby, have access to multiple sources of information, end up being well informed although their initial information
is lost completely. In large populations, we similarly obtain that agents learn the true state with probability one (i.e. wise
crowds emerge, cf. Golub and Jackson, 2010) if too central agents are very conform.
We allow for conformity in an opinion formation framework since there is substantial empirical evidence that
individuals conform to the actions of others when these actions are observable (as stated opinions are). For instance in
the famous study by Asch (1955), subjects wrongly judged the length of a line after other participants of the experiment
(conceived as neutral by the subjects, but being collaborators) had placed the same wrong judgment. Follow-up studies
revealed that this effect is weaker if the subjects do not have to report their judgments publicly (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955).
In the study by Asch (1955), subjects were asked for the reasons of their wrong judgment. Some said they were convinced of
the wrong answer by the collaborators; others said that they knew that their answer was wrong, but felt uncomfortable by
not conforming to what the collaborators said (see Asch, 1955, p. 21). Deutsch and Gerard (1955), hence, distinguish two
forms of social influence that can be observed in this study. While informational social influence describes the updating of
(true) opinions according to what others have said, normative social influence describes the behavior of stating an opinion
that fits the group norm.3
Normative social influence is also documented with respect to other publicly observable behavior. In an experiment on
charitable giving, Zafar (2011) shows that individuals adjust more to the contributions of their neighbors (and hence
conform more by reducing respectively increasing their contribution), the more their donations are observable, supporting
the findings by Asch (1955) and Deutsch and Gerard (1955). Moreover, subjects in Zafar's experiment mainly conform to the
actions of participants who are their friends outside the lab. Hence, normative social influence is determined by the social
network itself. Zafar (2011) concludes that individuals experience “a utility gain by simply making the same choice as [their]
reference group” (Zafar, 2011, p. 774). Incentives to conform can be derived from desires for social status (Bernheim, 1994)
and are embodied in a utility component that depends on the difference of the behavior of the focal actor and the behavior
of some peer group (Jones, 1984).
While normative social influence affects the choice of stated opinions, informational social influence embodies the
updating of the true opinions. We assume that individuals update their true opinions naïvely rather than sophistically since
empirical evidence strongly suggests that individuals in these settings behave boundedly rational (Corazzini et al., 2012;
Grimm and Mengel, 2013; Battiston and Stanca, 2014). If individuals were fully rational, they would perfectly account for
repetition of information (for some references on Bayesian learning in opinion formation, see Gale and Kariv, 2003;
Acemoglu et al., 2011; Sethi and Yildiz, 2012; Mueller-Frank, 2013; Sethi and Yildiz, 2013). In fact, evidence from laboratory
experiments shows that even in small social networks (of only four people) where the network is made common
knowledge, people fail to properly account for repetitions of information (Corazzini et al., 2012; Battiston and Stanca, 2014).
In more complex networks, other studies (Chandrasekhar et al., 2012; Grimm and Mengel, 2013) also confirm that learning
in the lab is very well approximated by the naïve learning approach.
Hence, we model informational social influence by assuming that individuals learn naïvely fromwhat others say (see also
DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and Jackson, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2010). In view of the substantial empirical evidence, we
enrich the naïve learning model by studying the effects of individuals who have a desire to adjust their behavior (i.e. their
stated opinion) to the behavior of their friends (i.e. their friends' stated opinions). In the words of psychology, this
corresponds to modeling normative social influence. Remarkably, this type of influence has not been studied in a theoretical2 A personality trait that has been found to discriminate opinion leaders from followers is called ‘public individuation’ (Chan and Misra, 1990). It
measures by a list of questions the extent to which “people choose to act differently than others” (Maslach et al., 1985).
3 Deutsch and Gerard (1955, p. 629) further explain: “Commonly these two types of influence are found together. However, it is possible to conform
behaviorally with the expectations of others and say things which one disbelieves but which agree with the beliefs of others. Also, it is possible that one
will accept an opponent's beliefs as evidence about reality even though one has no motivation to agree with him, per se.”
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fill this gap by studying a model incorporating both informational and normative social influence. We focus on two motives
for the misrepresentation of opinions: conformity and counter-conformity, while we also allow for honest agents.5 The
desire to relate own stated opinions to the stated opinions of friends is given by an additional utility component
parameterized by a preference parameter which we call the agent's degree of conformity. If positive, an agent is of
conforming type and states an opinion which is a convex combination of own true opinion and other agents' stated
opinions. If negative, an agent is counter-conforming and will state a more extreme opinion. This overstatement of opinions
is similar to, but less extreme than, the behavior in Kalai and Kalai (2001). Finally, if an agent's degree of conformity is zero,
the agent is honest, i.e. behaving like agents in the standard DeGroot model.
We consider heterogeneous societies whose agents are connected by a social network and endowed with individual
levels of (counter-)conformity. In contrast to the DeGroot model, the law of motion in our model may have negative entries,
due to counter-conformity of some agents.6 We study opinion dynamics in this model with a focus on opinion leadership
and wisdom of the society.
Related models: There is a growing body of literature that studies naïve learning in social networks. DeMarzo et al. (2003)
introduce this approach into the economics literature arguing that people are often unable to properly account for repetition
of information. The underlying assumption of a “persuasion bias” is helpful to understand different empirical phenomena
such as the importance of airtime in political discussions and it has also found empirical support in the laboratory (Corazzini
et al., 2012; Grimm and Mengel, 2013; Battiston and Stanca, 2014) and in the field (Chandrasekhar et al., 2012; Breza et al.,
2014). Among naïve agents the social network becomes vital in the sense that not only accuracy of information but also
network centrality determines an agent's influence on her group (DeMarzo et al., 2003). This form of social influence makes
naïve agents prone to be misled by powerful actors such as community leaders or lobbyists (Acemoglu et al., 2010). On the
other hand, dispersed pieces of information can also be efficiently aggregated among naïve agents if the influence of each
individual is vanishingly small (Golub and Jackson, 2010). The crucial question is hence under which conditions exchange of
opinions among naïve agents leads to efficient information aggregation which is also called wisdom. While in Golub and
Jackson (2010) the result holds asymptotically for large societies, even finitely many naïve agents can be wise, if all
individuals take their personal signals into account in a Bayesian way (Jadbabaie et al., 2012), or if one fully Bayesian agent
exists (Mueller-Frank, 2014). Our model takes the examination of the questions of power and wisdom to a further level since
it incorporates not only the social network structure but also individual degrees of conformity.
The modeling approach of the above literature roots in the pioneer work of French (1956), Harary (1959), DeGroot (1974)
and Friedkin and Johnsen (1990).7 Several variations of the naïve learning approach can be found with respect to arrival of
new information in every period (Jadbabaie et al., 2013), exogenously varying influence weights (Lorenz, 2005), adaption of
influence weights (Hegselmann and Krause, 2002; Flache and Torenvlied, 2004; Pan, 2010), or even manipulation thereof
(Foerster et al., 2013). The focus of many of these models is to provide conditions for convergence, or to determine opinion
leadership. We contribute to this literature by allowing agents to misrepresent their opinion and study the effect on opinion
leadership and wisdom. In a context of cultural transmission of traits, Buechel et al. (2014) introduce strategic interaction for
the DeGroot model in an OLG framework. While this resembles counter-conforming misrepresentation of opinions, their
model differs with respect to the optimization problem of individuals, the updating rule, and the resulting dynamics.
Besides these highly related works, there are several contributions to somewhat similar research questions, but with
respect to different settings. While their discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, we refer the reader to the following
few prominent examples: other models of social learning (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993, 1995; Bala
and Goyal, 1998, 2001; Sethi and Yildiz, 2012), cooperative models of social influence (Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2010,
2011), a model of strategic influence (Galeotti and Goyal, 2009), a model on rumors (Merlone and Radi, 2014) and a fairly
general approach to dynamic games with informational externalities (Rosenberg et al., 2009). Most of these models
investigate social influence on a discrete choice of actions, such as the choice of one out of two technologies, as opposed to
continuous opinions. The framework of Rosenberg et al. (2009) goes beyond discrete action choice. In fact, Rosenberg et al.
(2009) subsumes strategic misrepresentation of opinions under Bayesian learning as a special case and provides conditions
such that a consensus is reached.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model. After presenting the main
results (in Section 3), Section 4 addresses the wisdom of the society and in Section 5 we conclude, while proofs are relegated
to the appendix.4 Meanwhile, the concepts of informational and normative social influence have become a cornerstone in analyzing social influence, e.g. Ariely and
Levav (2000, p. 279) call it the “primary paradigm”. However, this paradigm did not explicitly enter economic models. The terms ‘social influence’ and
‘conformity’ do usually not clarify whether social or normative influence is at work. We will be more explicit on this distinction and only refer to
conformity as a form of normative social influence. In terms of this paradigm, the DeGroot model of opinion formation and its variations are models of
informational social influence, but not of normative social influence.
5 This is consistent with the psychological theory where identification, non-identification and disidentification lead to these three types of normative
social influence (Hogg and Abrams, 1988).
6 Negative entries are not only remarkable because of the different dynamics they induce, but also because of their interpretation as a negative relation
between two agents: Although only positive weights are put on each other's opinions, an agent may negatively incorporate a peer's opinion.
7 We adopt their assumptions on naïve learning to model informational social influence.
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2.1. Informational social influence
There is a set of agents N ¼ f1;2;…;ng who interact with each other. A learning structure is given by a nn row
stochastic matrix G, i.e. gijZ0 for all i; jAN and
Pn
j ¼ 1 gij ¼ 1 for all iAN . This learning matrix represents the extent to which
agents listen to other agents and it can be interpreted as a weighted and directed social network. We say that there is a
directed path from i to j in this network if there exists i0;…; ikAN such that i0 ¼ i and ik ¼ j and gililþ 140 for all
l¼ 0;…; k1, which is equivalent to ðGkÞij40.8 Moreover, we assume that giio1 for all i to assure that all agents update
their opinion.
We study a dynamic model where time is discrete t ¼ 0;1;2… and initially each agent has a predefined opinion xið0Þ
concerning some topic. The opinions of all agents at time t are collected in xðtÞARn. In every period, agents talk to each
other and finally update their opinions according to the matrix G. In the classical DeGroot model agents exchange opinions
such that the opinions in period tþ1 are formed by xðtþ1Þ ¼ GxðtÞ ¼ Gtþ1xð0Þ (DeGroot, 1974). The motivation for such a
model is that agents always report their true opinions and suffer from persuasion bias when the next period's opinion is
formed as a weighted average of own and others' opinions according to the social network G. Concerning the assumption of
honesty in opinion formation, DeMarzo et al. (2003) note:8 W
while t
9 D
10
Moreov
11 F
suppor
slightly
12
analysi“For simplicity, we assume that agents report their beliefs truthfully.”9We relax this assumption: an agent iAN expresses some opinion siðtÞAR which need not coincide with her true opinion
xiðtÞ.10
A central assumption of our approach is that an agent cannot observe the true opinions of the others but only their stated
opinions. Since each agent knows her own true opinion xiðtÞ, we get that agent i0s next period's opinion is formed by
xiðtþ1Þ ¼ giixiðtÞþ
P
ja igijsjðtÞ, where the weights gij are the individual learning weights as in the classical model by DeGroot
(1974). This holds for all agents iAN and, thus, the updating process becomes
xðtþ1Þ ¼DxðtÞþðGDÞsðtÞ; ð1Þ
where D is the nn diagonal matrix containing the diagonal of G.
2.2. Normative social influence
Misrepresenting the own opinion (i.e. being dishonest) might cause discomfort (e.g. Festinger, 1957). However, there are
various motives to misrepresent the own opinion. Not only strategic considerations of persuasion play a role, but also
personality traits or emotional motives. There is ample evidence that many people feel discomfort from stating an opinion
that is different from their peer group's opinion (e.g. Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). While certainly many people feel this type
of normative social influence, this need not be true for all people – there are even some who prefer to state an opinion that
is far away from what others say.11 We focus on these two motives for the misrepresentation of opinions: conformity and
counter-conformity.
To formalize these ideas, consider an agent i who is confronted with some group opinion qi, while her own opinion on
this topic is xi. In the spirit of the model of Bernheim (1994) we consider a utility function that depends on an intrinsic part –
this will be the incentive to be honest – and a social part – this will be the incentive to conform/counter-conform.
Additionally, we assume that utility of an agent is additively separable into these two parts and that for each part disutility
takes a quadratic form.
Thus, the utility of agent i depends on the distance of true opinion xi to stated opinion si as well as on the distance of
stated opinion si to group opinion qi in the following way:
uiðsijxiÞ≔ð1δiÞ sixið Þ2δi siqi
 2
; ð2Þ
where δiAð1; þ1Þ displays the relative importance of the preference for (counter-)conformity in relation to the preference
for honesty. Negative δi captures a preference for counter-conformity.12 The degree of conformity can be considered a
personality trait, but it might also depend on the topic under discussion. Let Δ denote the nn diagonal matrix with entries
δiA ð1;1Þ on the diagonal representing the levels of conformity in the society.e follow the convention of Jackson (2008) and DeMarzo et al. (2003) that a directed link from agent i to agent j indicates that i listens to j, i.e. gij40,
he opposite convention is used by Corazzini et al. (2012).
eMarzo et al. (2003, p. 3, footnote 9).
The incentive to state an opinion different from true opinion will be based on preferences for conformity or counter-conformity (cf. Section 2.2).
er, agents adapt their stated opinions faster than true opinions such that s(t) is given by Proposition 1.
or instance, Hornsey et al. (2003) conducted a laboratory experiment where subjects reported their willingness to privately or publicly express and
t their opinion. For subjects with a strong moral basis on the topic, the treatment of suggesting that a majority of the other subjects disagreed
increased the willingness to publicly express the opinion.
We assume that δi41 to restrict counter-conformity to a certain bound which seems weak enough to cover all reasonable cases, but keeps the
s tractable.
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types are common knowledge and without assuming that agents are sophisticated in anticipating the consequences of their
behavior. For this purpose we consider an adaption process of stated opinions which takes place within a time period t,
while true opinions are updated from one period to the next.13 Thus, suppose that within each period tAN, there is a fast
time scale τAN such that at each time step τ one or more agents speak. The (possibly random) set of agents who are
selected to state their opinions at time step τ (of period t) is denoted by AτðtÞ. Let sτðtÞ be the vector of stated opinions.
Agents who are not selected to revise keep the stated opinion of the previous time step, i.e. sτi ðtÞ ¼ sτ1i ðtÞ if iAN \AτðtÞ.
Agents, who are selected to speak and thereby revise their stated opinion, observe last time step's stated opinions of their
neighbors. These are perceived as a reference opinion qτ1i ðtÞ, which is the average of the stated opinions with weights
according to the listening matrix G, i.e.
qτi tð Þ ¼
X
ja i
gij
1gii
sτj tð Þ: ð3Þ
In line with our assumption that agents are naïve when updating, we also assume that agents are boundedly rational when
revising their stated opinions. Upon revision opportunity, i.e. iAAτðtÞ, an agent i myopically chooses a stated opinion which
maximizes her current utility given by (2), i.e.
sτi ðtÞ ¼ ð1δiÞxiðtÞþδiqτ1i ðtÞ; ð4Þ
for any true opinion xiðtÞ and any reference opinion qτ1i ðtÞ. Hence, the stated opinion given by myopic best response differs
from the true opinion proportionally to the difference of reference opinion and true opinion, and the proportion is
determined by the preference parameter δi. The parameter δi can thus be directly interpreted as the degree of conformity of
agent i0s behavior. A conforming agent, characterized by δiA ð0;1Þ, states an opinion between the true opinion xiðtÞ and
perceived opinion qτ1i ðtÞ. A counter-conforming agent, characterized by δiAð1;0Þ, states an opinion that is more extreme
than the true opinion xiðtÞ (with respect to the perceived opinion qτ1i ðtÞ). Finally, an honest agent, characterized by δi ¼ 0,
straight-forwardly states the true opinion, i.e. sτi ðtÞ ¼ xiðtÞ for all τAN.
To ensure that every agent takes part in opinion exchange in period t, we assume that for each agent i, the set
fτAN: iAAτðtÞg is (almost surely) infinite, reflecting the idea that no agent will stay forever with a stated opinion that is not
in line with her preferences. This assumption is satisfied if, e.g., at each time step τ agents are randomly selected to speak
according to some probability distribution with full support on N .
It turns out that such a myopic best reply process within period tAN inevitably leads to one specific profile of stated opinions
sðtÞ which only depends on the network G and the conformity parameters Δ, but not on the starting stated opinions s0ðtÞ.
Proposition 1. Given the assumptions above, the within-period dynamics sτðtÞ converge for τ-1 to
sðtÞ≔½IΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞ1ðIΔÞxðtÞ: ð5Þ
The proof of Proposition 1 as well as all proofs of the following propositions are relegated to an appendix. Proposition 1
shows that agents who revise opinions by conforming or counter-conforming to what their neighbors last said, finally state
the opinions given by (5).
It is worth noting that considering the action sets SiðtÞ ¼R and utility functions uiðsiðtÞjxiðtÞÞ given by (2) implies that s(t)
obtained by Proposition 1 is the unique Nash equilibrium of the normal form game ðN ; SðtÞ;uðjxðtÞÞ for each tAN. Note that
the process that leads into this Nash equilibrium within period t neither requires complete information (e.g. on the network
structure G), nor high degrees of rationality, nor some sort of common knowledge.
2.3. Model summary
In our model each period tAN can be viewed as a discussion round within which agents express opinions and then learn
from one discussion round to the next. Proposition 1 determines which opinions are finally stated in a given period as a
function of the true opinions x(t). These stated opinions s(t) determine the vector of reference opinions q(t) by (3) and are
then a crucial ingredient of the updating process.14 Since opinions of period tþ1 are formed by (1) and the stated opinions
of each period can be calculated as in Proposition 1, we conclude that the opinion profile in period tþ1 depends on the
opinion profile in period t in the following way:
xðtþ1Þ ¼MxðtÞ; ð6Þ
where M≔DþðGDÞ½IΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞ1ðIΔÞ. Note that the transformation from xðtÞ to xðtþ1Þ, i.e. the matrix M, is
independent of xðtÞ. Thus, the opinion dynamics are fully described by the power series Mt , since xðtþ1Þ ¼MxðtÞ ¼M2xðt1Þ ¼13 An interpretation for this assumption is that each period is a discussion round within which stated opinions are adjusted, while learning takes place
between discussion rounds.
14 Since one interpretation for qiðtÞ is that this is the society's opinion at time t as perceived by agent i, we also call it i's perceived opinion.
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¼ Gtþ1xð0Þ. In that light, the misrepresentation of opinions leads to a transformation of the matrix G into the matrix M. If every
agent is honest, i.e. δi ¼ 0 for any iAN , then M¼ G and, hence, we are back in the standard case of DeGroot (1974).3. Opinion dynamics
In this section we study opinion dynamics in the long run. We first elaborate on conditions of convergence of opinions
(Section 3.1). Then we determine where opinions converge to for strongly connected societies (Section 3.2) and for
unconnected societies (Section 3.3).
3.1. Convergence
By convergence we mean that opinions settle down in a steady state, but not necessarily that a consensus in the society is
reached. In the standard DeGroot model, convergence of opinions is obtained under very mild conditions, which basically
exclude cycling dynamics (Golub and Jackson, 2010). In our more general model, opinions may not only converge or cycle,
but also diverge, as we will show below.
Mathematically, convergence of opinions is driven by convergence of Mt. Indeed, since xðtÞ ¼Mtxð0Þ, true opinions xðtÞ
converge for arbitrary starting opinions xð0Þ if and only if Mt convergences. Counter-conforming agents can lead to negative
entries of matrix M which may but need not make Mt divergent. Conversely, honest and conforming agents do not induce
negative entries of M such that convergence can be guaranteed by standard results.
Proposition 2 (Convergence). If we have gii40 and δiZ0 for all iAN , then Mt , true opinions xðtÞ, stated opinions sðtÞ, and
perceived opinions qðtÞ converge for t-1.
The condition presented here is fairly weak. If we exclude counter-conformity (δiZ0), and every individual has at least
some self-confidence, then the opinion dynamics converge. The assumption of positive self-confidence thereby only serves
to assure aperiodicity of matrix M which could also be generated by weaker assumptions. Although all cases of conformity
are covered by Proposition 2, it is important to emphasize that conformity is not necessary for convergence.
For instance, consider the case of n¼2 agents with identical level of (counter-)conformity δ1 ¼ δ2≕δ and weights
g12; g21A ð0;1Þ of listening to each other. In this case, we find that the eigenvalues of M are given by unity and
λ≔1 1
1þδ g12þg21
 
o1: ð7Þ
Opinion dynamics therefore converge if and only if λ41, i.e. if and only if conformity δ exceeds the obviously negative
threshold ðg12þg21Þ=21, showing that convergence is possible under counter-conformity. Fig. 1 exemplifies opinion
dynamics for g12 ¼ 0:4, g21 ¼ 0:2, xð0Þ ¼ ð0;100Þ0, varying δ from conformity (δ¼ 0:5) via honesty (δ¼ 0) to counter-
conformity with convergence (δ¼ 0:6) and eventually counter-conformity strong enough to induce divergence
(δ¼ 0:75). Notice that, in this example, speed of convergence is faster under honesty (δ¼ 0) than both under conformity
(δ¼ 0:5) and counter-conformity (δ¼ 0:6). In general, therefore, speed of convergence is not monotonous in conformity.
While for the case of only two agents it is easily possible to characterize the speed of convergence (this is also true for the
case δ1aδ2) and to compare it with the DeGroot model by setting δ¼ 0, the results do not simply generalize to larger
societies, even when assuming homogeneous conformity and self-confidence (δi ¼ δ, gii ¼ d for all agents). For this most
simple special case, eigenvalues λM of M and λG of G are related to each other via
λM ¼ dþ 1dð Þ 1δ
  λGd
1dδðλGdÞ
:
This relation implies that the dynamics of Mt are governed by
κM≔ max
1aλGeigenvalue of G
dþ 1dð Þ 1δ  λGd
1dδðλGdÞ

: ð8Þ
If κMo1, then Mt will converge at rate κtM , if κM ¼ 1, the system will cycle, and if κM41, it will diverge. The crux with (8) is
that κM in general cannot be written as a function of κG≔maxfjλGj: λGeigenvalue of Gg because, typically, different values of
δ will lead to different eigenvalues λG of G being the maximizers in (8).
As we have seen, although tight convergence conditions on the matrix M are known, it is, even in special cases, difficult
to trace these conditions back to the model fundamentals, namely the network G and the distribution of conformity Δ. For
every numerical example, however, it is an easy computational exercise to determine M and Mt and thereby establish the
dynamic properties including whether opinions converge or not. Therefore, we now assume for the remainder that the15 The simple linear structure is of course implied by our assumption of quadratic utility.
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Fig. 1. Four cases of two-agent dynamics for δ1 ¼ δ2 ¼ δ. Solid lines represent true opinions while dashed lines display stated opinions.
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negative entries in M.3.2. Long-run opinions and opinion leadership
Given convergence, we now address where opinions converge to (in the long run) when starting with some opinion
profile xð0Þ. We are particularly interested in the influence of each agent's initial opinion on the long-run opinion given her
position in the network G and her degree of conformity δi. To simplify the discussion, let us focus on the case that G is
strongly connected, which is equivalent to the assumption that rkðIGÞ ¼ n1, where rk denotes the rank of a matrix (cf.
Golub and Jackson, 2010). The interpretation of this assumption is that each agent is at least indirectly influenced by every
other agent. While we have mentioned above that true, stated, and perceived opinions converge under the same conditions,
the following lemma shows that these opinions all converge to one point.
Lemma 1. Let the society be strongly connected and denote by v the left unit eigenvector of M with normalization
P
jAN vj ¼ 1. If
opinions converge, i.e. limMt for t-1 exists, then for every iAN,
xið1Þ ¼ sið1Þ ¼ qið1Þ ¼
X
jAN
vjxjð0Þ: ð9Þ
Since Lemma 1 establishes that true, stated, and perceived opinions always converge to the same limit, we can restrict
our analysis of the long run to the dynamics of true opinions. As it is common in the literature on naïve learning, strongly
connected societies converge to a consensus opinion which is a mixture of the agents' initial true opinions. From Eq. (9), we
see that vj captures the weight of agent j's initial opinion on the consensus opinion, which is a very intuitive formalization of
opinion leadership: v measures the power of each agent. We now investigate how power is determined by the network G
and the degrees of conformity δi.
Suppose first that δi ¼ 0 for all iAN . Then M¼G and Lemma 1 yields that opinion leadership is fully determined by the
left unit eigenvector of G, which we will denote byw. This vector (w) is a well-studied object in network science: it is known
as eigenvector centrality and captures how well-connected each agent is in the social network (Bonacich, 1972; Friedkin,
1991).16 Relaxing the assumption that every agent is honest, the following result shows how opinion leadership is not only
determined by eigenvector centrality, but also by the degree of conformity.
Theorem 1. Let the society be strongly connected and denote by w and v the normalized left unit eigenvectors of G and M,
respectively. If opinions converge, i.e. limMt for t-1 exists, then power of every agent iAN is given by
vi ¼
ð1δiÞwiP
jAN
ð1δjÞwj
: ð10Þ16 More precisely, this index of centrality is recurrently defined via the rows of G0 (i.e. via the columns of G) such that an agent's centrality is the
weighted sum of centralities of the agents who listen to her.
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network centrality in G (wi) and the individual conformity δi divided by the sum of these values over all agents. As it
becomes apparent from (10), there is a complementary relationship between network centrality and 1δi: power is
minimal (vi close to zero) if either i's network centrality wi is very low or if i is fully conform (δi close to 1). In the same
sense, power is maximal if all other agents' power is minimal, relative to own power. Taking the network as given, we can
directly derive from Theorem 1 the comparative statics with respect to the level of conformity of any agent:
∂vi
∂δk
¼ wkPn
j ¼ 1
wjð1δjÞ
vi1i ¼ kð Þ: ð11Þ
From (11) we get for all iAN that opinion leadership is decreasing in own conformity δi and increasing in other agents'
conformity δk, ka i, since wjA ½0;1 and 1δjZ0 for all jAN . Thus, low own conformity fosters opinion leadership. This
finding is consistent with empirical evidence that opinion leaders are characterized by low levels of conformity (Chan and
Misra, 1990). While a negative relation between conformity and opinion leadership is intuitive, Theorem 1 goes beyond this
observation by providing a direction of causality and by quantifying the effect. Importantly, it shows how conformity
interacts with the network position and with the conformity levels of the other members of the society.
In particular, consider a society where all agents are characterized by the same trait, i.e. δj ¼ δ for all jAN . Then (10)
yields v¼w: opinion leadership is not affected by conformity when all agents are characterized by the same level of
conformity. Relaxing the assumption of homogeneous conformity, we have viZwi if and only if δir
P
ja iðwj=
P
ka iwkÞδj, i.e.
an agent “gains” power in a comparative statics sense compared to the case of homogeneous conformity if her level of
conformity is below some average of the others' conformity levels.
The following corollary of Theorem 1 shows which agent's power changes most in response to a marginal increase in her
own conformity.
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, we have
∂vi
∂δi

o ∂vj∂δj

 3 w2j 1δj w2i 1δi o wjwi 
Xn
k ¼ 1
wk 1δk
 
: ð12Þ
Thus, if two agents have the same network centrality wi¼wj, then by (12), ∂vi=∂δi
 o ∂vj=∂δj  if and only if δioδj.
In other words, the agent with the already higher degree of conformity and thus lower power loses even more power
in response to a marginal increase in conformity compared with an agent with low conformity. Holding δi ¼ δj, we get
∂vi=∂δi
 o ∂vj=∂δj  if and only if wiowj, which implies that for two agents with equal conformity the agent with the higher
network centrality loses more power when increasing own conformity.
3.3. Beyond strongly connected networks
So far, we have assumed that the society is strongly connected such that G is irreducible. Here, we show briefly that the
results extend to non-connected societies. For non-connected societies we introduce the following notation:
Definition 1. Let ΠðN ;GÞ ¼ fC1; C2;…; CK ;Rg be a partition of N into KðZ1Þ groups and the (possibly empty) rest of the
world R such that: Each group Ck is strongly connected, i.e. for all i; jACk there exists lAN such that ðGlÞij40. Each group Ck is closed, i.e. for all iACk, Gij40 implies jACk. The (possibly empty) rest of the world (ROTW) consists of the agents who do not belong to any closed and strongly
connected set, i.e. R¼N \⋃Kk ¼ 1Ck.
With a suitable renumeration, the matrix G can be organized into blocks which correspond to the groups of the partition
ΠðN ;GÞ. Since individuals both listen and react only to their neighbors in the network G, they are not influenced by
individuals to whom there does not exist a (directed) path in the network. Hence, the block structure of the law of motionM
is the same as the block structure of G.
G¼
G11 0
⋱
0 GKK
GR1 ⋯ GRK GRR
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA ) M¼
M11 0
⋱
0 MKK
MR1 ⋯ MRK MRR
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA ð13Þ
with Gkk ¼ GjCk , GRR ¼ GjR, and GRk consisting of the rows of G belonging to R and the columns of G belonging to Ck and
analogously for M.
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carry over straightforwardly to the closed and strongly connected subgroups by restricting to each submatrix Mkk. Only in
the ROTW different phenomena may occur.
In particular, the long-run opinions of the strongly connected and closed groups Ck converge to consensus and can be
calculated as in (10) by restricting to the respective submatrices Mkk. Note that the groups may reach different consensuses.
Thus by Theorem 1, each row of M1kk is given by the left unit eigenvector v
0
jCk , implying
ck≔xið1Þ ¼ xjð1Þ ¼ v0jCk xð0ÞjCk 8 i; jACk; ð14Þ
where v0jCk is a combination of network centrality and conformity related to the sum of the group's centrality and conformity
given by (10).
As in the standard model, the ROTW cannot influence the long-run opinion of anyone including themselves since the
groups Ck do not pay attention to them, and, thus, their own opinions get washed out in the long-run as jλRRjAð1;1Þ for
all eigenvalues λRR of the submatrixMRR. The long-run influence of the respective groups Ck on the ROTW can be calculated
to be (see Proposition A.1 in Appendix A.4)
M1Rk ¼ ðIGRRÞ1GRkM1kk ð15Þ
for all k¼ 1;…;K . Since Γ≔ðIGRRÞ1ðGR11jC1 ;…;GRK1jCK Þ is easily seen to be row-stochastic, the long-run opinion of
individuals in the ROTW iAR are simply weighted averages of the consensuses of the groups Ck to which they are connected
by G, i.e.
xið1Þ ¼ ei0Γc¼ γi;1c1þ⋯þγi;kck; ð16Þ
where ei is the i-th unit vector. Since the weights γij only depend on the network G, agents in the ROTW average between
consensuses of the groups exactly as in the standard DeGroot model. Consequently, the long-run opinion of an agent in the
ROTW does not depend on an initial opinion of any agent within the ROTW (including herself). Thus, the only way
conformity of agents in the ROTW can affect long-run opinions is to induce divergence, since extreme counter-conformity
can induce divergence just as in the closed and strongly connected groups. The agents in the ROTW do not necessarily reach
a consensus if there is more than just one closed and strongly connected group, since each agent in the ROTW may average
differently between consent opinions of the closed and strongly connected groups.
Thus, the previous analysis extends straightforwardly to multiple groups with the difference that multiple consensuses
may emerge. The ROTW features the phenomenon that individuals are not influential and hence their conformity does not
matter (except for convergence).
4. Wisdom17
a simil
Others
18
19“The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, but wiser people so
full of doubts.”17The discussion so far applies to any continuous opinion including those for which no true value can be determined. In
some applications, however, agents' opinions are more or less accurate with respect to some objective truth. As in the
discrete context of Condorcet's Jury theorem, the question whether agents aggregate information in an efficient way is also
of interest in the context of continuous opinions (Golub and Jackson, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2010). We will now introduce
the concept of wisdom to our model (Section 4.1) and study its properties for members of closed and strongly-connected
groups (Section 4.2) and for members of the rest of the world (Section 4.3). Finally, we turn to asymptotical wisdom in large
societies (Section 4.4).
4.1. Framework
Assume that there is some true value μAR and that all agents of the society receive independent unbiased signals about
μ with individual precision (i.e. inverse of the variance) which constitute the agents' initial opinions. Formally, agent i's
initial opinion xið0Þ is a random variable with expected value μ and some individual variance σi2, and for all iAN , xið0Þ are
uncorrelated random variables. Assuming that opinion dynamics converge, a natural question to ask is how close the
different long-run opinions will be to the true, but to the agents unknown, value μ.18 To this end, let us denote the long-run
consensus opinion of some group by μ^, with μ^ being – ex ante – random due to the random initial values x1ð0Þ;…; xnð0Þ. The
difference μ^μ then describes by how much the long-run consensus opinion deviates from the true value μ, and ðμ^μÞ2 is
a measure for the amount of this estimation error. For measuring the ex ante expected magnitude of the estimation error,
we use the expected value of ðμ^μÞ2, i.e. the mean squared error (MSE) of μ^ as an estimator of μ, defined as Eððμ^μÞ2Þ.19Credit for this quote is often given to Bertrand Russell although the origin of the quote is actually unknown. It is at least confirmed that Russell made
ar statement in his essay “The Triumph of Stupidity” (10 May 1933), which can be found on pp. 203–204 in the collection of essays “Mortals and
”.
Recall that in the long run true opinions and stated opinions coincide and there is consensus within groups.
The mean squared error as a measure of wisdom has also been used by Rauhut and Lorenz (2011).
Fig. 2. Network for wisdom example. This society consists of three closed and strongly connected groups of size two and four agents in the rest of
the world.
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Eððμ^μÞ2Þ ¼ ðEðμ^μÞÞ2þVarðμ^Þ:
As xð1Þ ¼M1xð0Þ and M11¼ 1, it is obvious that Eðxð1ÞÞ ¼ μ1, i.e. all agents' long-run opinions are unbiased estimates
for μ. Denoting by Σ the covariance matrix of xð0Þ, the corresponding MSEs are therefore given by the entries on the
diagonal of M1ΣðM1Þ0. To illustrate the effects of conformity on wisdom, we study the following example, to which we will
return in the next two subsections.
Example. Let n¼10, ðσ21;…;σ210Þ ¼ ð6, 4, 8, 7, 6, 3, 10, 12, 14, 16Þ, and
G¼
0:9 0:1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0:4 0:6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0:8 0:2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0:3 0:7 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0:7 0:3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0:3 0:7 0 0 0 0
0:1 0 0 0 0 0 0:9 0 0 0
0 0 0:2 0:3 0 0 0 0:5 0 0
0:1 0 0 0:1 0 0 0 0 0:8 0
0 0 0 0 0 0:2 0 0 0:2 0:6
0
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
In this situation, we have K¼3 closed and strongly connected groups, C1 ¼ f1;2g, C2 ¼ f3;4g, and C3 ¼ f5;6g, while Players 7–
10 form the rest of the world, as also illustrated in Fig. 2. If all agents report their opinions truthfully (Δ¼ 0), we find the
MSEs equal to (4, 4, 4, 4, 2.25, 2.25, 4, 4, 2, 1.0625). There are several notable features of this observation. First, due to the fact
that their long-run opinions are equal, all agents within a given closed and strongly connected group share the same level of
wisdom. Comparing the first two groups, we note that the MSEs of these two groups are 4 each, although the first group
enjoys significantly better initial signals (of variances 6 and 4), while the second group seems to combine their less precise
signals (of variances 8 and 7) much more effectively. It is also remarkable that Player 2, by communicating with Player 1,
ends up with exactly the same MSE of 4 that she would reach if she used only her own signal. With respect to the rest of the
world, notice that these agents typically have different MSEs. Furthermore, Players 7 and 8 each end up with the same MSE
as the first two groups, while Players 9 and 10 achieve MSEs better than all members of the closed and strongly connected
groups.
Now suppose that Players 2, 3, and 5 are conforming with δ2 ¼ 5=9, δ3 ¼ 2=3, and δ5 ¼ 1=2 (and δi ¼ 0 for all other
players). Then wisdom levels can be calculated to be (4.9, 4.9, 4, 4, 2, 2, 4.9, 4, 2.225, 1.05625). Thus, increasing conformity
can lead to a decrease in wisdom (as the first group's MSE becomes larger), the same wisdom (as the second group's MSE
does not change), or an increase in wisdom (as the third group's MSE becomes smaller). We also find that the agents in the
rest of the world are affected by the changes in conformity of the agents in the closed and strongly connected groups: the
MSE of Players 7 and 9 increases, while Player 10's MSE decreases slightly. It still holds that Player 7 and 8's MSEs equal that
of the first and second group, respectively.
We will now proceed by systematically analyzing the principles underlying the distribution of wisdomwithin the society.
4.2. Wisdom of groups
Due to (14), a group Ck will, given convergence, eventually end up reaching a consensus where all agents' opinions are
equal to ck ¼ v0jCkxð0ÞjCk≕μ^k.
20 Hence, we can directly derive group Ck's wisdom as the MSE of μ^k.20 The discussion of groups also applies to a strongly connected society, since such a society simply consists of one single group.
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MSEk≔E ðμ^kμÞ2
 
¼
X
iACk
v2i σ
2
i ¼
X
iACk
ð1δiÞwiP
jACk
ð1δjÞwj
0
B@
1
CA
2
σ2i :
We may use Lemma 2 to identify the individual contributions to the MSE in a given group Ck. First, from Lemma 2 it
follows directly that
MSEk ¼
X
iACk
v2i σ
2
i r
X
iACk
viσ2i rmax
iACk
σ2i ; ð17Þ
since v2i rvi due to viAð0;1 for all agents i. Thus, group Ck's long-run opinion is on average at least as close to the true value
μ as that of the agent with the least precise signal. This worst case is given when both inequalities in (17) become equalities,
which is the case for viAf0;1g for all iACk (first inequality) and vi¼0 for all i with σ2i omaxjACkσ2j (second inequality).
Therefore, information updating within group Ck is worst when importance is given to only one agent whose signal is most
imprecise. This case would be approached if all other agents were close to full conformity, i.e. δi close to 1. We now consider
the comparative statics effect of one agent's conformity on the wisdom of her group.
Proposition 3. The wisdom of a closed and strongly connected group Ck is increasing in the conformity level of a group member i
if and only if i0s product of signal variance and power is larger than the group's MSE, i.e.
∂MSEk
∂δi
r0 3 viσ2i ZMSEk:
To give an interpretation for Proposition 3, let us rewrite viσ2i ¼ vi=ð1=σ2i Þ and MSEk ¼
P
jACk vjðvj=ð1=σ2j ÞÞ. This shows that
it is not a person's expertise alone which is decisive for the question of how this person can increase the group's wisdom,
rather, it is the ratio of power over signal precision, vi=ð1=σ2i Þ: if agents with a high ratio as compared to the group's average
are more conforming, then this will reduce their power within the group, decrease the group's MSE, and thereby increase its
wisdom. Vice versa, agents who are not powerful enough in relation to their signal precision will increase the group's
wisdom if they are less conforming, because this will increase their power, decrease the group's MSE, and foster its
wisdom.21
The above discussion implies that in the best possible case, the ratio of power over signal precision is constant within a
group: viσ2i ¼ vjσ2j for all i; jACk. This is formalized in the following corollary of Proposition 3.
Corollary 2. For the wisdom of group Ck as measured by MSEk, we have
MSEkZ
1P
jACk
1
σ2j
≕MSEnk ; ð18Þ
with equality in (18) if and only if viσ2i ¼ vjσ2j for all i; jACk. The latter condition is equivalent to
δi ¼ 1a
1
σ2i wi
P
jACk
1
σ2j
for all iACk ð19Þ
for some constant aAð0;2PjACk ð1=σ2j ÞminjACkwjσ2j Þ.
Corollary 2 delivers the analogue to (17). While (17) describes the worst case with respect to wisdom, Corollary 2 considers
the best scenario: all agents within a closed and strongly connected group share the same ratio of power over signal
precision, and this case can always be constructed if the agents' conformity is distributed suitably. In particular, choosing
aAð0;PjACk ð1=σ2j ÞminjACkwjσ2j  in (19) ensures δiZ0 for all iACk and therefore by Proposition 2 guarantees convergence of
the opinions in Ck to the best possible consensus μ^k. Notice also that the optimal MSE is smaller than individual signal
variance σi
2
for all agents i in group Ck, as is easily seen from (18). Therefore, under optimal conformity all agents within Ck
benefit from communication.
Reconsidering the example discussed in Section 4.1, we find the network centralities (the left unit eigenvectors of G) to
be w1¼0.8, w2¼0.2, w3¼0.6, w4¼0.4, w5¼0.5, and w6¼0.4. Therefore, in (19) the constant a can be chosen in the intervals
ð0;2=3Þ (group 1) and ð0;3=2Þ (groups 2 and 3). Choosing a¼ 1=3 (group 1) and a¼ 3=4 (groups 2 and 3) delivers δ1 ¼ 5=6,
δ3 ¼ 5=12, and δ5 ¼ 1=2 (and δi ¼ 0 for all other agents). Thus, setting the agents' degrees of conformity according to these
values ensures the optimal wisdom within the respective groups, given by (2.4, 2.4, 3:73, 3:73, 2, 2, 2.4, 3:73, 1:53, 0:883).
The same level could also be reached for other conformity levels, for instance, choosing a¼ 1=4 (first group), a¼ 3=7 (second21 An analogous discussion can be already found in DeMarzo et al. (2003) for the case where agents are honest.
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the optimal wisdom. Notice that, as in Golub and Jackson (2010), wisdom thus is independent of the speed of convergence,
as we have two examples with the same optimal wisdom but different speeds of convergence (the last-mentioned
conformity levels lead to slightly slower convergence than the earlier mentioned ones).
4.3. Wisdom within the rest of the world
Let us recall that agents in the rest of the world do not necessarily share a consensus opinion in the long run, so that we
will typically have individual wisdom levels. Due to (16), we have the following formula for the long-run opinions within
the rest of the world: xð1ÞjR ¼Γμ^, with μ^≔ðμ^1;…; μ^K Þ0. Therefore, the wisdom levels in the rest of the world depend on the
conformity levels of the agents in the closed and strongly connected groups as these affect the consensus opinions μ^k of
these groups. On the other hand, as neither the initial signals nor the conformity levels of the agents in the rest of the world
play any role for their long-run opinions, these agents' wisdom is independent of their conformity levels as well as of their
initial signals. In other words, if the rest of the world is non-empty, information processing in the society is necessarily
inefficient as the information contained in these agents' initial signals is inevitably lost. Assuming convergence, let γi;k
denote the long-term weight of the group Ck on the opinion of agent iAR, i.e. xið1Þ ¼
PK
k ¼ 1 γi;kμ^k (cf. (16)). This
immediately translates into the wisdom of an agent iAR as follows:
Eððxið1ÞμÞ2Þ ¼
XK
k ¼ 1
γ2i;kMSEkr max
k ¼ 1;…;K
MSEk: ð20Þ
The wisdom of an agent in the rest of the world depends on the wisdomwithin the closed and strongly connected groups. More
precisely, an agent i's wisdom only depends on the wisdom of groups Ck to which there is a directed path in the network G
because this corresponds to γi;k40. The worst case for an agent in the rest of the world is to be influenced only by agents of one
closed and strongly connected group with maximal MSE. With regard to the example discussed in Section 4.1 this is the case
for Players 7 and 8 who have directed paths only into group 1 and group 2, respectively, such that they share their MSEs of 4
(cf. Fig. 2). Player 9, however, who has directed paths into both groups with MSE of 4 reaches an MSE of 2 since the long-term
weights γ9;1 ¼ 0:5 and γ9;2 ¼ 0:5 are squared in (20). Finally, Player 10 has directed paths into these groups via Player 9 and,
moreover, has a directed path into group 3. Player 10 therefore is able to combine MSEs of 4, 4, and 2.25 into an MSE as low as
1.0625. It is intuitive that for maximal wisdom of an agent in the rest of the world, all groups' signals have to be accessed with
some kind of balanced group weights. The following proposition confirms this intuition.
Proposition 4. For agents iAR, we have
E ðxið1ÞμÞ2
 
Z
1PK
k ¼ 1
1
MSEk
; ð21Þ
with equality if and only if
γi;k ¼
1
MSEk
PK
l ¼ 1
1
MSEl
for all k¼ 1;…;K .
Therefore, the highest wisdom is achieved if an agent in the rest of the world averages the different groups' opinions in such
a way that the product of weight put on a group and its MSE is constant for all groups: the better a group's estimate, the
more weight it should get. Nevertheless, as all the optimal weights are positive, this optimum can only be achieved if from
agent i there is a directed path into all the closed and strongly connected groups. Notice also that the optimal weights
depend on the groups' MSEs such that an agent in the rest of the world who is initially characterized by optimal weights
would no longer average the groups' opinions optimally if conformity levels within the groups were to change.
It is remarkable that an agent in the rest of the world who is connected to multiple groups can reach a significantly lower
MSE than the best informed agents from those groups. Thus, the fact that agents in the rest of the world are absolutely
powerless does not imply that they are not wise.
4.4. Asymptotic learning
So far, we have studied learning in the framework of opinion dynamics under conformity with respect to a finite
population. Since information aggregation is simply a weighted average of initial signals, individuals will never learn the
true state of the world μ with probability 1, a commonly observed finding in models based on naïve learning. Golub and
Jackson (2010) instead look at growing societies and determine conditions for wise crowds such that the obtained
consensus converges in probability to the unknown state of the world.
To show how our approach to learning extends to large crowds, denote by N(n) the population set depending on the
population size n and assume that there is a sequence of aperiodic and strongly connected networks ½GðnÞ1n ¼ 1 as well as a
sequence of conformity values ½δi;n1n ¼ 1 for all iANðnÞ such that each law of motion M in the sequence ½MðnÞ1n ¼ 1 is
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distribution with mean μ and bounded variance σ2i;n such that 0oσ2rσ2i;nrσ2o1. We say that the society N(n) is
asymptotically wise if the MSE tends to zero, i.e. Eððμ^ðnÞμÞ2Þ-0 for n-1, where the estimator μ^ðnÞ is given by the
consensus opinion xnð1Þ, as before. Since initial signals are unbiased and variance is bounded, this is easily seen to be
equivalent to μ^ðnÞ converging to μ in probability which is exactly what Golub and Jackson (2010) define to be wise crowds
(cf. Golub and Jackson, 2010, Definition 3).
Since by Lemma 2 (see also Golub and Jackson, 2010, Proposition 2), maxi ¼ 1;…;nvi;n-0 for n-1 is necessary and
sufficient for (asymptotically) wise crowds, we get that the society is asymptotically wise if and only if
maxi ¼ 1;…;nwi;nð1δi;nÞPn
i ¼ 1 wi;nð1δi;nÞ
-
n-1
0: ð22Þ
Now, we can study the effect of conformity on asymptotical wisdom. First, suppose that δi;n is bounded away from 1, i.e.
conformity is bounded.
Corollary 3. Let δi;nrδo1. The society is asymptotically wise if and only if maxi ¼ 1;…;nwi;n-0.
Thus, for bounded conformity, we arrive exactly at the same result as Golub and Jackson (2010): the society is
asymptotically wise if and only if no individual has excessive influence on others in terms of a prominent network position.
However, even if some members of the society become too prominent, which undermines asymptotical wisdom under
honesty (cf. Golub and Jackson, 2010, Proposition 3), high conformity of these prominent families may still result in
asymptotical wisdom, as we will show.
Assume for example that we have wi;n40 for n-1 such that i asymptotically becomes too important with respect to the
network position. Then, for crowds to be wise, we require δi;n-1, i.e. prominent individuals have to be asymptotically highly
conform. However, this is not sufficient as we need to ensure that δi;n converges to 1 at the right speed. Too slow
convergence to 1 may not be sufficient for their prominence to vanish and too fast convergence may cause non-prominent
agents with vanishing network centrality (wj;n -
n-1
0) to emerge as prominent in terms of vj;n, causing asymptotical wisdom
to fail. The following result presents tight conditions on conformity for the society to be asymptotically wise.
Proposition 5. The society is asymptotically wise if and only if δi;n is of the form
δi;n ¼ 1βn
αi;n
wi;n
with positive sequences ½βn1n ¼ 1 and ½αi;n1n ¼ 1 such that MðnÞt converges in t (for all n), βn;αi;n40,
P
i ¼ 1…nαi;n ¼ 1,
βno2mini ¼ 1…nwi;n=αi;n, and maxi ¼ 1…nαi;n -
n-1
0.
To give some intuition to the above conditions, note that 1δi;n being proportional to αi;n=wi;n ensures that power vi;n is
balanced in an asymptotical sense. Non-vanishing network centrality then yields vanishing power since αi;n-0. In other
words, those with high network centrality, need to be highly conforming. The sequence βn ensures that all δi;n are
distributed within ð1;1Þ. In particular, choosing βno1 mini ¼ 1…nwi;n=αi;n would exclude counter-conformity and thereby
imply convergence for all δi;n by Proposition 2. In societies where the underlying sequence of networks is already wise (see
Golub and Jackson, 2010), i.e. where honesty (δi;n ¼ 0 for all iAN, nAN) is sufficient for wisdom, αi;n ¼wi;n and βn ¼ 1 for all
iAN, nAN fulfill the conditions of Proposition 5.
It is quite easy to see that for any sequence of connected networks many sequences ½βn1n ¼ 1 and ½αi;n1n ¼ 1 exist that lead
to asymptotic wisdom. As a particular example, consider the conformity distribution such that network centrality and signal
precision are balanced as in Corollary 2, i.e. for all nAN conformity is such that
δi;n ¼ 1
an
σ2i;nwi;n
Pn
j ¼ 1
1
σ2j;n
with anAð0;
Pn
j ¼ 1ð1=σ2j;nÞminj ¼ 1;…;nwj;nσ2j;nÞ. Then it does not only hold that for any nAN the MSE is minimized, but also
that the society is asymptotically wise since δi;n satisfies the required conditions by choosing
αi;n ¼
1
σ2i;n
Pn
j ¼ 1
1
σ2j;n
and βn ¼ an. Another example which always ensures wisdom is to set αi;n ¼ 1=n and βnon minni ¼ 1wi;n for all iAN;nAN.
Then power is evenly distributed, vi;n ¼ 1=n for all nAN.
To sum up, bounded conformity has no effect on asymptotical wisdom. However, even if wisdom fails under honesty by
e.g. having prominent families, we still get wisdom if these families are sufficiently conform. Hence, if the sequence of22 A sequence of convergent ½MðnÞ1n ¼ 1 can be achieved e.g. by only allowing non-negative values of δi;n (see Proposition 2).
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they are not wise under honesty.235. Concluding remarks
So far, the literature on opinion dynamics has mainly focused on truthful opinion representation either with a Bayesian
approach (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Smith and Sorensen, 2000; Gale and Kariv, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2011)
or assuming naïve updating according to a learning matrix (DeGroot, 1974; DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and Jackson, 2010;
Acemoglu et al., 2010). Despite some disputable assumptions in both approaches, as Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) point
out, these models help us understand conditions under which societies will eventually reach a state of agreement, i.e.
consensus. Moreover, in both contexts the aggregation of initial opinions may, but need not, be efficient in the sense that
social learning leads to a high accuracy of information in the long run. One basic force fostering efficient information
aggregation even among naïve agents is a statistical effect of growing sample size (which is also called “the wisdom of
crowds”) such as in Condorcet's Jury Theorem. On the other hand, prominent agents or opinion leaders might reduce the
accuracy of information aggregation by superseding valuable opinions of others.
To our best knowledge, this paper is the first contribution to incorporate misrepresentation of opinions among naïve
agents. We assume that individuals depart from their true opinion by conforming or counter-conforming with their peer
group which is a well documented phenomenon (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Jones, 1984; Zafar, 2011). Following the
literature based on DeGroot (1974) in modeling informational social influence as naïve updating of opinions through the
network, we, thus, also model normative social influence by including conforming/counter-conforming behavior. In order to
study the effects of conformity on long-run opinions and information aggregation, we discuss sufficient conditions for
convergence and characterize the long-run opinions in this dynamic framework. When all agents are conforming or honest,
then opinions converge (Proposition 2).
Assuming convergence, we then characterize the long-run (consensus) opinion (Theorem 1). Thereby, we are in a
position to study the impact of the individual levels of conformity on opinion leadership and on wisdom of the society.
Opinion leaders are those whose initial opinion has a high impact on consensus. We find that this influence is increasing in
network centrality (as in the DeGroot model), but moreover decreasing in the individual level of conformity. Thus, taking
the network as given, we conclude that low conformity fosters opinion leadership while high conformity undermines
opinion leadership so that counter-conformity might be interpreted as a persuasion device. This result is fully in line with
empirical evidence that opinion leaders are characterized by a higher inclination to “publicly individuate” themselves (Chan
and Misra, 1990), but goes beyond it by showing how this effect depends on the network position and on the other
conformity levels in the society.
The effect of heterogeneous levels of conformity on wisdom of the society is ambiguous. Here, wisdom is defined as the
mean squared error (MSE) of the consensus opinion in a finite population setup where agents' initial opinions are noisy but
unbiased signals about some true state of the world with heterogeneous signal precision. Increasing conformity of a given
individual need not undermine the wisdom of the society, but can also enhance it or leave it unchanged. We find that
increasing conformity of agents with high power and low signal precision increases the group's wisdom (Proposition 3).
In particular, optimal wisdom within a given closed and strongly connected group is achieved if distribution of conformity
levels is such that ratio of power over signal precision is balanced across agents (Corollary 2). For large societies, we find
necessary and sufficient conditions on the sequence of conformity parameters such that asymptotic wisdom emerges, i.e.
such that the MSE converges to zero (Proposition 5). Hence, asymptotic wisdom is obtainable due to conformity, even if an
honest society is not wise (cf. Golub and Jackson, 2010). Such a sequence of conformity exists for any sequence of networks
and always reduces the prominence of influential agents by increasing their conformity which resembles the intuition
gained for finite societies. Finally, when considering agents in the rest of the world, we find that their levels of conformity
have no influence on wisdom. Although powerless, individuals in the rest of the world can be quite wise since they may
aggregate information from different groups.
The model presented here contains some simplifying assumptions which may be relaxed in future research. First, we
assumed that the social network is exogenous and stays fixed over time. In the literature we can find models where the
network structure may vary over time such that only agents with “close opinions” are listened to (Hegselmann and Krause,
2002), self-confidence varies (DeMarzo et al., 2003), and general changes are possible (Lorenz, 2005). It would be interesting
to see how changes in the learning structure, either exogenously or endogenously, affect our results. Second, we assumed
that interaction neighborhood equals observation neighborhood in the sense that agents conform or counter-conform with
those agents they listen to. If this assumption is relaxed, the group structure may no longer be preserved and interesting
applications to lobbying (addressing a certain group) become possible. We leave these ideas and possible other extensions
to future research.23 Of course, it is also possible to construct examples where the opposite effect emerges such that wise societies lose wisdom under conformity.
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A.1. Expressed opinionsProof of Proposition 1. First, notice that sðtÞ by construction satisfies sðtÞ ¼ ðIΔÞxðtÞþΔYsðtÞ with Y≔ðIDÞ1ðGDÞ and
that for all iAAτðtÞ, sτi ðtÞ is the i-th component of ðIΔÞxðtÞþΔYsτ1ðtÞ. For all iAAτðtÞ, we therefore find sτi ðtÞsiðtÞ as the i-
th component of ΔY sτ1ðtÞsðtÞ . We now study this difference by the maximum norm (J  J1), which is also called
infinity norm. As Y is obviously a row-stochastic matrix, we immediately have jsτi ðtÞsiðtÞjrδ
n Jsτ1ðtÞsðtÞJ1 for all
iAAτðtÞ, with δn≔maxiAN jδijo1, while we have jsτi ðtÞsiðtÞj ¼ jsτ1i ðtÞsiðtÞjr Jsτ1ðtÞsðtÞJ1 for all i=2AτðtÞ. Together, we
therefore have that JsτðtÞsðtÞJ1r Jsτ1ðtÞsðtÞJ1 for all τ, showing that the distance between sτðtÞ and sðtÞ is a non-
increasing and therefore converging sequence. Now, let UiðtÞ≔fτAN: iAAτðtÞg, for each agent i. Using the assumption that
every agent i belongs almost surely to infinitely many AτðtÞ, we define τ1≔min fτAN: ð8 iAN ÞðUiðtÞ \ f1;…; τga∅Þg as the
first time-step where every agent has at least once been satisfied with her stated opinion.24 Given the above, it is easy to see
that Jsτ1 ðtÞsðtÞJ1rδn Js0ðtÞsðtÞJ1. Proceeding in the same way by recursively defining τkþ1≔minfτ4τk:
ð8 iAN ÞðUiðtÞ \ fτkþ1;…; τga∅Þg as the first time-step after τk such that all agents have at least been once satisfied with
their stated opinion, we then have Jsτk ðtÞsðtÞJ1rðδnÞk Js0ðtÞsðtÞJ1, yielding that Jsτk ðtÞsðtÞJ1 and therefore also
JsτðtÞsðtÞJ1 converges to 0. □
A.2. Convergence
To prove Proposition 2 (and Lemma 1 and Theorem 1) the following lemma is helpful.
Lemma A.1 (I-M). IM¼ IðGDÞΔðIDÞ1
 1
ðIGÞ.
Proof of Lemma A.1 (I-M). First, we can rewrite M, given by (6), to obtain
M¼ GðGDÞðIΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞÞ1ΔðIðIDÞ1ðGDÞÞ:
This can be verified by the following calculation.
M¼DþðGDÞðIΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞÞ1ðIΔÞ
¼DþðGDÞ IΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞ
h i1
IΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞ
h
þΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞΔ
i
¼DþðGDÞðIþ IΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞ
h i1
ΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞΔÞ
h i
¼ GðGDÞ IΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞ
h i1
Δ IðIDÞ1ðGDÞ
h i
:
Thus,
IM¼ IGþðGDÞ IΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞ
h i1
ΔðIDÞ1ðIGÞ
¼ IþðGDÞ IΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞ
h i1
ΔðIDÞ1
 
ðIGÞ: ðA:1Þ
Now, note that for any nm-matrix A and any mn-matrix B, with Ik the k-dimensional identity matrix ðkAfn;mgÞ, we
have that InAB is invertible if and only if ImBA is invertible, and then ðInABÞ1 ¼ InþAðImBAÞ1B,
since ðInþAðImBAÞ1BÞðInABÞ ¼ InABþAðImBAÞ1BAðImBAÞ1BAB¼ InABþAðImBAÞ1ðImBAÞB¼ In. Taking
A¼ GD and B¼ΔðIDÞ1 in (A.1) then gives IM¼ IðGDÞΔðIDÞ1
 1
ðIGÞ. □
Proof of Proposition 2. Denote Y≔ðIDÞ1ðGDÞwhich is row stochastic. Thus, as jδijo1 for all iAN , we have that IΔY
is invertible and ðIΔYÞ1 ¼ P1k ¼ 0 ðΔYÞk. Moreover, if δiZ0 for all iAN , the sum P1k ¼ 0 ðΔYÞk is a sum of non-negative24 The assumption that all UiðtÞ are almost surely infinite guarantees that τ1; τ2 ;… are almost surely well-defined.
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since it is the product of non-negative matrices (since 0ogiio1) added to D, which is a diagonal matrix with strictly
positive entries (0ogii). Finally, since M1¼ 1 by Lemma A.1, we get that M is row stochastic. Since the diagonal of D is
strictly positive, we get that the diagonal of M is strictly positive, mii40, implying aperiodicity of M. Thus, M
t converges.
This implies that xðtÞ converges since xðtÞ ¼Mtxð0Þ. From Proposition 1, we get that sðtÞ ¼ ðIΔðIDÞ1ðGDÞÞ1ðIΔÞxðtÞ.
Thus convergence of xðtÞ implies convergence of sðtÞ. By definition we have that qðtÞ ¼ ðIDÞ1ðGDÞsðtÞ, and hence convergence
of sðtÞ implies convergence of qðtÞ. □A.3. Long-run opinions and opinion leadershipProof of Lemma 1. We first show that xð1Þ ¼ sð1Þ ¼ qð1Þ and then turn to xið1Þ ¼
P
jAN vjxjð0Þ for all iAN .
From xðtþ1Þ ¼DxðtÞþðGDÞsðtÞ ¼DxðtÞþðIDÞqðtÞ, we can infer for all tZ0 that xðtÞ ¼Dtxð0ÞþPt1l ¼ 0 Dt1 lðIDÞqðlÞ,
the first part of which converges to 0 because all elements of the diagonal matrix D belong to ½0;1Þ.
The limit of xðtÞ therefore equals
lim
t-1
xðtÞ ¼ lim
t-1
Xt1
l ¼ 0
Dt1 lðIDÞqðlÞ ¼ lim
t-1
Xt1
l ¼ 0
Dt1 lðIDÞðqðlÞqð1ÞÞþ lim
t-1
Xt1
l ¼ 0
Dt1 lðIDÞqð1Þ:
First, note that the second limit equals qð1Þ, becauseP1l ¼ 0 Dl ¼ ðIDÞ1. For the first limit, note that for any ε40, we can
find an index lε such that we have JqðlÞqð1ÞJoε for all l4 lε. Splitting the sum into small l (lr lε) and large l (l4 lε), we
then easily see that the first term converges to 0. Therefore, xðtÞ converges to qð1Þ. Since sðtÞ ¼ ðIΔÞxðtÞþΔqðtÞ, sðtÞ also
shares the same limit.
For the second part, we use the assumption that the society is strongly connected, which is equivalent to rkðIGÞ ¼ n1.
This implies rkðIMÞ ¼ n1 due to Lemma A.1 which also delivers M1¼ 1.
Observe that MM1 ¼M1 ¼M1M. This implies that the columns of M1 must be multiples of 1,
 the rows of M1 must be multiples of v0,from which we find M1 ¼ r 1v0 for some real number r which is found to be equal to 1 as 1¼M11¼ r 1v01¼ r 1. Hence,
xð1Þ ¼M1xð0Þ ¼ 1v0xð0Þ. □
Proof of Theorem 1. As rkðIGÞ ¼ n1 (by strong connectedness) and v0ðM IÞ ¼ 0, we have due to Lemma A.1
0¼ v0ðIMÞ ¼ v0 IðGDÞΔðIDÞ1
 1
ðIGÞ;
implying that the left unit eigenvector w of G and v relate to each other by
v0 IðGDÞΔðIDÞ1
 1
¼ r w0
for some real number r. Using w0G¼w0, we then find
v0 ¼ r w0 IðGDÞΔðIDÞ1
 
¼ r w0 IðIDÞΔðIDÞ1
 
¼ r w0ðIΔÞ:
The normalization of v then entails r¼ 1=w0ðIΔÞ1, which shows that v¼ ðIΔÞw=10ðIΔÞw. This yields (10). □
A.4. Beyond strongly connected networksProposition A.1 (M1 for ROTW). If Mt converges, we get
M1RR ¼ 0 and M1Rk ¼ ðIGRRÞ1GRkM1kk: ðA:2Þ
Proof of Proposition A.1. Suppose thatMt converges toM1. To determine the formulas forM1RR andM
1
Rk, we first establish
that GM1 ¼M1. We have Gx¼ x 3 ðIGÞx¼ 03 ½IðGDÞΔðIDÞ11ðIGÞx¼ 0, since by Lemma A.1
½IðGDÞΔðIDÞ1 is invertible. Thus by Lemma A.1, Gx¼ x if and only if Mx¼ x. Furthermore, MM1x¼M1x and
therefore GM1x¼M1x for all n-dimensional vectors x, delivering GM1 ¼M1. Since the block structure of G and M is the
same, this implies M1RR ¼ GRRM1RR and therefore ðIGRRÞM1RR ¼ 0, entailing M1RR ¼ 0 because IGRR is invertible, M1Rk ¼ GRkM1kkþGRRM1Rk, and therefore M1Rk ¼ ðIGRRÞ1GRkM1kk. □
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P
iACk vi ¼ 1. Therefore, its MSE equals its variance
which is given by
P
iACkv
2
i σ
2
i as the xið0Þ are uncorrelated. □
Proof of Proposition 3.
Please refer to Eq. (11).
∂MSEk
∂δi
¼
∂
P
jACk
v2j σ
2
j
∂δi
¼
X
jACk
2σ2j vj
∂vj
∂δi
¼ 2wiP
jACk
wjð1δjÞ
X
jACk
σ2j vj vj1j ¼ i
 
:
The assertion follows easily noting that MSEk ¼
P
jACk vjvjσ
2
j . □
A.6. Wisdom within the Rest of the WorldProof of Proposition 4. First, notice that Eððxið1ÞμÞ2Þ ¼
PK
k ¼ 1 γ
2
i;kMSEk, with
PK
k ¼ 1 γi;k ¼ 1 for all iAR. By the Cauchy–
Schwarz inequality, we have
1¼
XK
k ¼ 1
γi;k ¼
XK
k ¼ 1
γi;k
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
MSEk
p  1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
MSEk
p r
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃXK
k ¼ 1
γ2i;kMSEk
vuut
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃXK
k ¼ 1
1
MSEk
vuut ;
with equality if and only if there exists some (necessarily positive) constant a such that
γi;k
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
MSEk
p
¼ a 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
MSEk
p
for all k. We therefore have
XK
k ¼ 1
γ2i;kMSEkZ
1PK
k ¼ 1
1
MSEk
;
with equality if and only if
γi;k ¼
1
MSEk
PK
l ¼ 1
1
MSEl
for all k. □
A.7. Asymptotic learningProof of Corollary 3. From 1oδi;nrδ, we find that 1δr1δi;no2. The denominator of the ratio
maxi ¼ 1;…;nwi;nð1δi;nÞPn
i ¼ 1 wi;nð1δi;nÞ
-
n-1
0
is therefore always between the positive numbers 1δ and 2 such that the ratio converges to zero if and only if its
numerator converges to zero. With respect to the numerator, as the factor 1δi;n is both bounded from above by 2 and
bounded away from zero by 1δ40, the numerator converges to zero if and only if maxi ¼ 1;…;nwi;n -n-10 converges to zero,
which completes the proof. □
Proof of Proposition 5.1. If δi;n ¼ 1βnαi;nwi;n, then wi;nð1δi;nÞ ¼ βnαi;n and
maxi ¼ 1;…;nwi;nð1δi;nÞPn
i ¼ 1 wi;nð1δi;nÞ
¼maxi ¼ 1;…;nβnαi;nPn
i ¼ 1 βnαi;n
¼ max
i ¼ 1;…;n
αi;n -
n-1
0;
i.e. the society is asymptotically wise.
2. Let the society be asymptotically wise. Set
αi;n≔
wi;nð1δi;nÞPn
j ¼ 1 wj;nð1δj;nÞ
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Pn
j ¼ 1 wj;nð1δj;nÞ. Then βn;αi;n40, βno2minni ¼ 1wi;n=αi;n, and
Pn
i ¼ 1 αi;n ¼ 1. Furthermore, wi;nð1δi;nÞ ¼ βnαi;n,
entailing
max
n
i ¼ 1
αi;n ¼ max
n
i ¼ 1
αi;nPn
j ¼ 1 αj;n
¼ maxn
i ¼ 1
βnαi;nPn
j ¼ 1 βnαj;n
¼ maxn
i ¼ 1
wi;nð1δi;nÞPn
j ¼ 1 wj;nð1δj;nÞ
-
n-1
0:
□
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